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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:
Priority No. 2

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

CAROL A. FIX,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 950093-CA

:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a3(2) (f) Utah Code Annotated.
On November 4, 1994, a jury convicted Defendant of Leaving the Scene of an
Injury Accident, a class "A" misdemeanor, in violation of § 41-6-31 Utah Code Annotated.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support a verdict of Leaving the Scene of an
Injury Accident?
Standard of review: Appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's
verdict, then demonstrate how this evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light, is
insufficient to support the verdict.

An appellate court will reverse on the basis of

insufficient evidence only when the evidence is so inconclusive or improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant
committed the crime.

2. Did the trial court commit reversible error by excluding evidence of State's
witness' intent to sue defendant?
Standard of review: The trial court's ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Appellant must show that the error would have had a substantial influence in bringing
about a different verdict.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Section 41-6-31 Utah Code Annotated, Leaving the Scene of an Injury Accident,
a class "A" misdemeanor.
Wording not at issue
Rule 608(c), Utah Rules of Evidence: Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any
motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness . . . by examination of the
witness . . .
STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendant/Appellant, Ms. Fix, was driving in Ogden on March 25,1994, in mid-day.
Another driver, Lori BRYAN, felt Defendant was following too close and showed the
Defendant the "finger.'1 The Defendant was upset by this and followed Lori Bryan through
the streets of Ogden, then up Ogden Canyon and to a day-care center where Lori Bryan
was to pick up her child. Some strong words were exchanged before Lori Bryan went
into the day-care center, having noted Defendant's license number.

Defendant then

proceeded to spit at and into Lori Bryan's car.
Normand Knudson was in the yard with his father and heard the verbal exchange
and saw the Defendant spitting into the car. He walked toward the Defendant's car as
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she began to drive away. He held up one hand to stop her car since the day-care was
private property and posted with "No Trespassing" signs. Knudson worked at the daycare and his mother operated it. The Defendant continued to drive forward and hit
Knudson who rolled on her hood and landed on his feet falling against a chain link fence.
Defendant continued to drive away and did not return. The Deputy Sheriff responding
to the call was given the address by dispatch of the departing car's license number. He
went to that address and obtained a statement from the Defendant about the incident.
Then he went to the scene at the day-care and spoke with Lori Bryan, Mr. Knudson and
his father. The Defendant was then charged with Aggravated Assault and Leaving the
Scene of an Injury Accident.
THE TRIAL
After Lori Bryan testified, Mr. Knudson testified that he could hear the confrontation
between Lori Bryan and the Defendant. He heard Lori say "I've got your license plate,
you're on private property. I'm going in the house to call the police and you need to
leave." On the defendant's part he heard "lots of profanity." P.1, Vol. 1.
Knudson observed "what appeared to be spitting . . . and within seconds of that
the car sped towards me and she hit me and she didn't slow down. She just took off
and sped out of the bridge. I pushed myself as much as I could from the side of the car
because in my mind I was afraid of being squished between the car or falling into the
fence and getting thrown back under the rear tires," P. 62, Vol. 2.
"When I did come off the car, by the time I was able to get turned around to try
and get a license plate n u m b e r . . . all I seen was the very back of the car speeding off
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. . . I realized I was going to be hit when s he was coming toward me, I took a couple of
steps backward, I put my hand out to try and motion for her," P. 3, Vol 1.
As for Knudson's injuries: "When I jumped in the air and the car hit me on my
legs, it threw me onto the hood of the car. I hit pretty hard .. . onto the car with my body
and that shoulder," P.65, Vol. 1.
"I slammed the same shoulder into the fence it was all in less than a second . . .
I also sustained some injuries to my right knee.

IVe had problems with my knee

dislocating since then," P.66, Vol 1.
Knudson testified he was "in home therapy, as far as stretching and exercising and
things like that," P.65, Vol. 1. More on the injures: "I had some minor scrapes on my
hands. I was wearing a thick levi jacket. It had some pretty serious scuffs and scrapes
on it, but nothing wore through my jacket to my skin on my arms,"

P. 69, Vol 1.

"I was definitely in a lot of severe pain in my right arm and right shoulder."
Knudson testified he sustained bruises but they may not have been visible to the naked
eye. "Not the naked eye, I guess. I don't know. I can't see my back . . . I didn't look in
a mirror," P.83, Vol. 1.
After Defendant drove away she did not return to the scene. P. 123, Vol. 1.
As to Knudson's bias against defendant, Knudson testified, "This woman is a threat
to society," P. 69, Vol. 1. Also, "anybody who would run somebody down for no reason
was a threat to society and I was concerned that she could get in her car and put a key
in it and go out and hit somebody else. I never met the lady. I didn't know her from
anyone and I was very agitated that someone could do something so heinous and still
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have the ability to get behind the wheel of a car and go out and do it again to someone
else if they choose," P. 71, Vol. 1.
The Deputy also testified about how Knudson felt toward Defendant. "Did Mr.
Knudson tell you that he wanted Carol Fix jailed for Attempted Homicide and held without
bail?" "He did" replied the Deputy. P. 149, Vol. 1. "Did he state to you that he would find
out where Carol lives and take care of the problem himself?"

Answer:

"He said

something to that affect, yes, and I advised him not do so, otherwise there would be
charges filed against him," P. 150, Vol. 1.
In his closing statement defense counsel said on the issue of Mr. Knudson's injury
or lack of injury: "There is no damage to the grille. There is no damage. There is no
injury. There is no visible injury. None of the rest matters if there was no injury," P. 214,
Vol, 2. "And if that's the amount of pain Mr. Knudson felt from the car, then that's not the
kind of pain that's described in these instructions. It has to be substantial pain." P. 215,
Vol. 2.
The jury acquitted the Defendant of Aggravated Assault and convicted her of
Leaving the Scene of an Injury Accident.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
First Issue: Was the evidence insufficient to support the verdict? Rather than
marshalling the evidence supporting the verdict, Defendant marshals the evidence pro
and con then argues for a reversal. Defendant urges that an injury suffered in the instant
case must be an "objectively observable injury." But defendant did not object to the
instruction given nor asked for additional or different instruction on "injury."
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Second Issue: Does the trial court's refusal to allow questioning of Knudson re:
intent to sue Defendant, warrant a reversal?
It is harmless error since Knudson's bias was already obvious to the jury!
ARGUMENT
Defendant raises the first issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support
the verdict of failure to Remain at the Scene of an Injury Accident. Defense counsel
chose to challenge in this appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.
The State points out that at the end of the trial Defendant moved to arrest judgement on
the very issue of sufficiency of the evidence as to the type and degree of injury suffered
by Knudson. That motion ^vas denied. The State submits that the proper recourse would
have been to appeal the denial of the motion to arrest judgement.
The State argues that the appellate court can dispose of the first issue even before
deciding whether defendant meets the burden of marshaling the evidence. The key is
Defendant's argument in the first paragraph on page 21 of the brief. Here Defendant
muses about whether the injury suffered should be subjective or objective. The evidence
is then marshalled to amplify on this topic.
As to what type or degree of injury is contemplated by the statute of failing to
remain at the scene of an injury accident, on page 2 of the brief, defense counsel "could
not find any Utah case law on the issue of whether there is an objective or subjective
standard for the findings of the jury." Yet defense counsel goes on undaunted, "Either
way, it is submitted that there must be objective evidence of injury."
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Instruction 19 to the jury reads as follows: "Bodily injury" means physical pain,
illness or any impairment of physical condition.
Defendant did not object to said instruction nor offered additional or different
instruction on the issue of "injury."
Since Defendant failed to raise this issue at the trial court level he cannot now raise
it at the appellate level. "It is a fundamental principle of appellate review that matters not
raised at the trial level cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." State in the Interest
of M.S.. 781 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah 1989). See also State v. John, 770 P.2d 994, 995
(Utah 1989).
As to marshaling the evidence: Defense counsel cites the correct standard of
review then proceeds to do violence to that standard.
Defendant cites the case of State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991) which
does define the standard.

"This court has limited authority to examine a jury verdict

challenged on the sufficiency of the evidence. We review the evidence and all references
which may be reasonably drawn in the light must favorable to the verdict. . . reversing
only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant
committed the crime. Furthermore, Defendant must marshall all evidence supporting the
jury's verdict and must then show how this marshaled evidence is insufficient to support
the verdict even when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict."
In Defendant's brief under the heading Marshaling the Evidence, defense counsel
devotes in a summarized form to the marshaling evidence most favorable to the verdict
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an entire paragraph, (page 15, second paragraph of brief), out of more than three and
a half pages. The rest of that section is devoted to evidence marshaled to put the
Defendant's case in a best light, i.e., "Ms. Fix gave an entirely different version . . . the
only evidence o f . . . Knudson's . . . injury . . . came from his own testimony . . . Ms. Fix's
statement, when read in its entirety, does not support a finding of injury . . .

Mr. Fix

testified that there was no impact with Normand Knudson . . . she was frightened and
left."
In marshaling the evidence defense refers repeatedly to evidence offered by the
State's witnesses as not credible. In State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976) also
cited by defense, the hi<\h court says "Further, this court has maintained that its function
is not to determine guilt or innocence, the weight to give conflicting evidence, the
credibility of witnesses, or the weight to be given Defendant's testimony.

In State v.

Goddard, 871 P.2d 540 (Utah 1994) the high court also states, "However, she is not
entitled to reversal of her conviction simply because her version of the facts are different
from the State's or simply because there are some gaps in the State's evidence. The
existence of contradictory evidence does not warrant disturbing the jury's verdict... The
jury need not accept the Defendant's version of the facts but may disregard it in whole
or in part. In essence Goddard urges us to retry the facts of this case on appeal, and
we refuse to do so."
In the case of Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, 236 Utah Adv.
Rep 24, the Court of Appeals said "This rigorous standard reflects the doctrine that
appellate courts do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed facts. Accordingly, when
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the duty to marshall is not properly discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of
challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid . . . Oneida has failed to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's factual findings. Rather than bearings
it's marshaling burden, Oneida has merely presented carefully selected facts and excerpts
of trial testimony in support of its position. Such selective citation to the record does not
begin to marshal the evidence; it is nothing more than an attempt to reargue the case
before this court - a tactic that we reject."
The State submits that the Defendant here indeed seeks to retry her case before
this court by citing carefully selected facts and excerpts of trial testimony in support of
her position.
AS TO THE SECOND ISSUE: Did the trial court err in refusing to allow evidence
of Normand Knudson's intention to sue Defendant? The State submits that this was
harmless error. On Page 98, 99 Vol. 1, the transcript reflects the following exchange:
Mr. Custen: Mr. Knudson, do you intend to sue Carol Fix for money damages?
Mr. Daroczi: Objection, irrelevant.
The Court:

Sustained.

Mr. Custen: May I approach?
The Court:

No, Sustained.

Mr. Custen: May I be heard outside of the presence of the Jury?
The Court:

No, sustained.

Mr. Custen: May I make a record?
The Court:

We'll allow you to make a record afterwards.
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This exchange was in the presence of the jury.
The State agrees with defense counsel that Rule 608(c) Utah Rules of Evidence,
does allow such evidence in as evidence of bias. It was error to exclude it. The issue
becomes whether it was reversible or harmless error.
Defense counsel cites on Page 2 of his brief under Standard of Review the case
of State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah '87). Hackford is applicable and the State
concedes error in violation of Rule 608(c). The State further submits that the analysis in
Hackford is also applicable as to whether the error was harmless. The court in Hackford
states, "Although we concede that Lane's testimony was a critical part of the case against
Hackford, the jury had sufficient information to fully appraise Lane's biases and
motivations . . . therefore, we find beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's error
was harmless."
In the instant case the jury was well aware from the testimony of Knudson and the
Deputy that Knudson was not only biased against but was incensed at the Defendant.
Therefore, the court's denial of Defendant's request to show that Knudson was biased
by his intent to sue Defendant, caused no harm. Defense counsel also cites the case of
State v. Rammel. 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986) which is helpful on this issue as well. In
Rammel, the high court states, "Where it is unlikely that the excluded testimony prejudiced
the defendant's rights in a substantial manner, the error is harmless . . . courts have
found no prejudice where information that may be brought out by further questioning was
already before the jury either from the testimony of others or by implication from the
witness' own testimony."

In Rammel the "jury was well aware of Herman's possible
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motivation for testifying as he did . . . Herman admitted that he had some very angry
feelings about what had happened. The jury also heard, and was not told to ignore, the
question posed as to whether Herman had instituted civil proceedings against Defendant.
We therefore conclude that although it was error to limit the cross-examination as to
Herman's bias and motive, the error was not prejudicial because additional crossexamination would not have had a substantial influence to bring about a different verdict."
The State submits that the fact situation on this issue is nearly identical with the
instant case: The jury heard and was not told to ignore defense counsel's question
whether Knudson intended to sue Defendant; the jury was well aware that Knudson had
some very angry feelings about what had happened. The State asks that the court follow
the reasoning and ruling of Rammel.
RELIEF SOUGHT
The State asks that the court affirm Defendant's conviction for Defendant's failure
to meet the standard of review as to both issues raised by the Defendant.

ORAL ARGUMENT IS NOT REQUESTED
Respectfully submitted this /J-

day of June, 1995.

LES DAROCZI
X V .
^S
DEPUTY WEBER C0UNTY ATTORNEY
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